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Abstract. We present a computer-supported approach for the logical
analysis and conceptual explicitation of argumentative discourse. Com-
putational hermeneutics harnesses recent progresses in automated rea-
soning for higher-order logics and aims at formalizing natural-language
argumentative discourse using flexible combinations of expressive non-
classical logics. In doing so, it allows us to render explicit the tacit con-
ceptualizations implicit in argumentative discursive practices. Our ap-
proach operates on networks of structured arguments and is iterative
and two-layered. At one layer we search for logically correct formaliza-
tions for each of the individual arguments. At the next layer we select
among those correct formalizations the ones which honor the argument’s
dialectic role, i.e. attacking or supporting other arguments as intended.
We operate at these two layers in parallel and continuously rate sen-
tences’ formalizations by using, primarily, inferential adequacy criteria.
An interpretive, logical theory will thus gradually evolve. This theory
is composed of meaning postulates serving as explications for concepts
playing a role in the analyzed arguments. Such a recursive, iterative
approach to interpretation does justice to the inherent circularity of un-
derstanding: the whole is understood compositionally on the basis of its
parts, while each part is understood only in the context of the whole
(hermeneutic circle). We summarily discuss previous work on exemplary
applications of human-in-the-loop computational hermeneutics in meta-
physical discourse. We also discuss some of the main challenges involved
in fully-automating our approach. By sketching some design ideas and
reviewing relevant technologies, we argue for the technological feasibility
of a highly-automated computational hermeneutics.
Keywords: computational philosophy, higher-order logic, theorem prov-
ing, logical analysis, hermeneutics, explication
“. . . that the same way that the whole is, of course, understood in
reference to the individual, so too, the individual can only be
understood in reference to the whole.”
Friedrich Schleiermacher (1829)
? Benzmu¨ller received funding for this research from VolkswagenStiftung under grant
CRAP 93678 (Consistent Rational Argumentation in Politics).
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2 D. Fuenmayor and C. Benzmu¨ller
1 Introduction
Motivated by, and reflecting upon, previous work on the computer-supported
assessment of challenging arguments in metaphysics (e.g. [13,12,33]), we have
engaged in the development of a systematic approach towards the logical analy-
sis of natural-language arguments amenable to (partial) automation with modern
theorem proving technology. In previous work [35,36] we have presented some
case studies illustrating a computer-supported approach, termed computational
hermeneutics, which has the virtue of addressing argument formalization and
assessment in a holistic way: The adequacy of candidate formalizations for sen-
tences in an argument is assessed by computing the logical validity of the argu-
ment as a whole (which depends itself on the way we have so far formalized all
of its constituent sentences). Computational hermeneutics has been inspired by
ideas in the philosophy of language such as semantic holism and Donald David-
son’s radical interpretation [27]. It is grounded on recent progresses in the area
of automated reasoning for higher-order logics and integrates techniques from
argumentation theory [36].
Drawing on the observation that “every formalization is an interpretation”,
our approach has initially aimed at fostering human understanding of argumen-
tative (particularly theological) discourse [35,7]. In the following sections, aside
from presenting a more detailed theoretical account of our approach, we want to
explore possibilities for further automation, thus gradually removing the human
from the loop. In section 2 we introduce the notions of ontology and conceptual-
ization as defined in the fields of knowledge engineering and artificial intelligence.
We use this terminological framework to discuss what it means for us to claim
that a logical theory can serve to explicitate a conceptualization. In section 3 we
discuss what makes our proposed approach hermeneutical. We briefly present a
modified account of Donald Davidson’s theory of radical interpretation and re-
late it to the logical analysis of natural-language arguments, in particular, to the
problem of assessing the adequacy of sentences’ formalizations in the context of
an argument (network). We show how an interpretive process grounded on the
logical analysis of natural-language argumentative discourse will exhibit a (virtu-
ous) circularity, and thus needs to be approached in a mixed recursive–iterative
way.
We also illustrate the fundamental role of computers in supporting this pro-
cess. In particular, by automating the computation of inferential adequacy crite-
ria of formalization, modern theorem proving technology for higher-order logics
can provide the effective and reliable feedback needed to make this approach a
viable alternative. In section 4 we briefly present an exemplary case study in-
volving the analysis of a metaphysical argument and discuss some technologies
and implementation approaches addressing some of the main challenges concern-
ing a highly-automated computational hermeneutics. In particular, we discuss
a key technique termed semantical embeddings [10,4], which harnesses the ex-
pressive power of classical higher-order logic to enable a truly logical-pluralist
approach towards representing and reasoning with complex theories by reusing
state-of-the-art (higher-order) automated reasoning infrastructure.
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2 Explicitating Conceptualizations
Computational hermeneutics helps us make our tacit conceptualizations explicit.
In this section we aim at building the necessary background to make best sense
of this statement. We start with a cursory presentation of the notion of an
ontology as used in the fields of artificial intelligence and knowledge engineering.
We introduce some of the definitions of (an) ontology drawing on the concept of
conceptualization (this latter notion being the one we are mostly interested in).
We then have a deeper look into the notion of conceptualizations and how they
can be explicitly represented by means of a logical theory.
2.1 Ontologies and Meaning Postulates
Ontology is a quite overloaded term, not only in its original philosophical scope,
but also in computer science. Trying to improve this situation, researchers have
made the apt distinction between “Ontology” and “an ontology” [42]. The term
“Ontology” refers to the philosophical field of study, which will not be considered
in this paper. Regarding the latter term (“an ontology”) several authoritative
definitions have been put forward during the nineties. We recall some of them:
Tom Gruber originally defines an ontology as “an explicit specification of a con-
ceptualization” [41]. This definition is further elaborated by Studer et al. [54]
as “a formal, explicit specification of a shared conceptualization”, thus empha-
sizing the dimensions of intersubjective conspicuousness and representability by
means of a formal language. Nicola Guarino, a pioneer advocate of ontologies in
computer science, has depicted an ontology as “a logical theory which gives an
explicit, partial account of a conceptualization” [42], thus emphasizing an aspect
of insufficiency: an ontology can only give a partial account of a conceptualiza-
tion.
These definitions duly highlight the aspect of explicitness: By means of the
articulation in a formal language, an ontology can become common and conspic-
uous enough to fulfill its normative role —as public standard— for the kind of
systems developed in areas like knowledge engineering and, more recently, the
Semantic Web. More technically, we see that an ontology (at least in computer
science) can be aptly considered as a kind of logical theory, i.e. as a set of sen-
tences or formulas. The question thus arises: Which particular formal properties
should the sentences comprising a logical theory have in order to count as an
ontology? To be sure, the logical theory may feature some particular annotation
or indexing schema distinguishing ‘ontological’ sentences from ‘non-ontological’
ones. But other than this there is no clear line outlining the ‘ontological’ sen-
tences in a logical theory.3
3 This is similar to the distinction between TBox and ABox in knowledge bases. Some
may claim that ‘ontological’ sentences (TBox) tend to be more permanent and mostly
concern types, classes and other universals; while other, ‘non-ontological’ sentences
(ABox) mostly concern their instances. The former may be treated as being always
true and the latter as subject to on-line revision. However, what counts as a class,
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This issue is reminiscent of the controversy around the old analytic–synthetic
distinction in philosophy. We do not want to address this complex debate here.
However, we want to draw attention to a related duality introduced by Carnap
[24] in his notion of meaning postulates (and its counterpart: empirical postu-
lates). Carnap’s position is that, in order to rigorously specify a language —or a
logical theory, for our purposes— one is confronted with a decision concerning
which sentences are to be taken as analytic, i.e. which ones we should attach
the label “meaning postulate”. For Carnap, meaning postulates are axioms of a
definitional nature, which tell us how the meanings of terms are interrelated.4
They are warranted by an intent to use those terms in a certain way (e.g. to draw
some inferences that we accept as valid) rather than by any appeal to facts or
observations. In this sense, meaning postulates are to be distinguished from fac-
tual assertions, also termed “empirical postulates”. A kind of analytic–synthetic
distinction is thus made, but this time by an appeal to pragmatical considera-
tions. Whether a sentence such as “No mammals live in water” is analytic, or
not, depends upon a decision about how to use the corresponding concepts in a
certain area of discourse; e.g. we may want to favor some inferences and disfavor
others (e.g. excluding whales from being considered as mammals). We thus start
to see how a listing of meaning postulates can give us some insight into the
conceptualization underlying a discourse. Following Carnap, we distinguish in
our approach between meaning and empirical postulates. The former are sets of
axioms telling us how the meanings of terms are interrelated, and thus constitute
our interpretive logical theory. The latter correspond to formalized premises and
conclusions of arguments which are to become validated in the context of our
theory.
As discussed above, it is rather the intended purpose which lets us consider
a logical theory (or a part thereof) as an ontology. We will thus conflate talk
of formal ontologies with talk of logical theories for the sake of illustrating our
computational-hermeneutic approach.
2.2 Conceptualizations
As seen from the above, definitions of (an) ontology depict a conceptualization,
by contrast, as something tacit and unarticulated; as something being hinted at
by the use of natural language, instead of being determined by the semantics
of a formal one. In the following, we want to evoke this connotation every time
we use the term conceptualization simpliciter. Our notion of conceptualization
what as an instance and what is subject to revision is heavily dependent on the use
we intend to give to the theory (knowledge base).
4 Recalling Carnap’s related notion of explication [23], we can think of a set of mean-
ing postulates as providing a precise characterization for some new, exact concept
(explicatum) aimed at “replacing” an inexact, pre-theoretical notion (explicandum),
for the purpose of advancing a theory. Thus, in computational hermeneutics, the
non-logical terms of our interpretive theory characterize concepts playing the role
of explicata aimed at explicitly representing fuzzy, unarticulated explicanda from a
tacit conceptualization.
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(simpliciter) thus refers to that kind of implicit, unarticulated and to some extent
undetermined knowledge being framed by human socio-linguistic practices, and
which is to become (partially) represented —and thereby made explicit— by
means of a logical theory. In particular, we envisage a certain special —and
arguably primordial— kind of socio-linguistic practice: argumentative discourse.
We have a formal definition for the notion of conceptualization starting with
Genesereth and Nilsson [39], who state that “the formalization of knowledge
in declarative form begins with a conceptualization. This includes the objects
presumed or hypothesized to exist in the world and their interrelationships.” In
their account, objects “can be anything about which we want to say something.”
Genesereth and Nilsson then proceed to formally define a conceptualization as
an extensional relational structure: a tuple 〈D,R〉 where D is a set called the
universe of discourse and R is a collection of relations (as sets of tuples) on D.
This account of a conceptualization has been called into question because of its
restricted extensional nature: A conceptualization, so conceived, concerns only
how things in the universe of discourse actually are and not how they could
acceptably be interrelated. The structure proposed by Genesereth and Nilsson as
a formal characterization of the notion of conceptualization seems to be more
appropriate for states of affairs or world-states; a conceptualization having a
much more complex (social or mental) nature.
Other, more expressive definitions for the notion of conceptualization have
followed. Gruber [41] states that a conceptualization is “an abstract, simplified
view of the world that we wish to represent for some purpose”; and Uschold
[57] sees a conceptualization as a “world-view”, since it “corresponds to a way
of thinking about some domain”. According to the account provided by Guarino
and his colleagues [42,43], a conceptualization “encodes the implicit rules con-
straining the structure of a piece of reality”. Note that this characterization, in
contrast to the one provided by Genesereth and Nilsson, does not talk about
how a “piece of reality” actually is, but instead about how it can possibly or
acceptably be, according to some constraints set by implicit rules.5 Guarino
has also provided a formal account of conceptualizations, which we reproduce
below (taken from [43]). In the following, we distinguish the informal notion
of conceptualization simpliciter from the formal, exact concept introduced be-
low. Note that we will always refer to the latter in a qualified form as a formal
conceptualization.
Definition 1 (Intensional relational structure, or formal conceptual-
ization). An intensional relational structure (or a conceptualization according
to Guarino) is a triple C = 〈D,W,R〉 with
– D a universe of discourse, i.e. an arbitrary set of individual entities.
– W a set of possible worlds (or world-states). Each world is a maximal observ-
able state of affairs, i.e. a unique assignment of values to all the observable
variables that characterize the system.
5 As we see it, those rules are (their tacitness notwithstanding) of a logical nature: they
concern which arguments or inferences are endorsed by (a community of) speakers.
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– R a set of intensional (aka. conceptual) relations. An intensional relation is
a function mapping possible worlds to extensional relations on D.
Taking inspiration from Carnap [23] and Montague [28], Guarino takes concep-
tual (intensional) relations to be functions from worlds to extensional relations
(sets of tuples). This account aims at doing justice to the intuition that concep-
tualizations —being arguably about concepts— should not change when some
particular objects in the world become otherwise related. However, formal con-
ceptualizations, while having the virtue of being exactly defined and unambigu-
ous, are just fictional objects useful to clarify the notion of an ontology.
2.3 Representing a Conceptualization by Means of a Theory
For Guarino and his colleagues, the role of formal conceptualizations in the def-
inition of an ontology is that of a touchstone. For them an ontology is —let us
recall their definition— “a logical theory which gives an explicit, partial account
of a conceptualization” [42]. Thus, an ontology —or more specifically: its mod-
els6— can only partially represent a conceptualization (formal or simpliciter).
In order to evaluate how good a given ontology represents a conceptualization,
Guarino has introduced a formal notion of ontological commitment (similar in
spirit to the well-known eponymous notion in philosophy). According to Guar-
ino, by using a certain language a speaker commits —even unknowingly— to a
certain conceptualization. Such a commitment arises from the fact that, by em-
ploying a certain linguistic expression (e.g. a name or an adjective), a language
user intends to refer to objects which are part of a conceptualization, i.e. some
individual or (conceptual) relation. Those objects may be tacit in the sense that
they become presupposed in our inferential practices.7
Guarino’s account leaves some room for partiality (incompleteness) in our
representations. By interpreting natural language, suitably represented as a log-
ical theory, an interpreter can indeed end up referring to entities other than
those originally intended or conceiving them in undesired ways. In such case we
would say that some of the models (interpretations) of the theory are not among
its intended models (see Fig. 1). In Guarino’s view, what is intended becomes
prescribed by the target conceptualization. For instance —to put it in informal
terms— the conceptualization I commit to could prescribe that all fishes live in
water. However, in one of the possible interpretations (models) of some theory
6 When we talk of models of a logical theory or ontology, we always refer to models
in a model-theoretical sense, i.e. interpretations: assignments of values (as denoted
entities) to non-logical terms.
7 For instance, the existence of human races may need to be posited for some eugeni-
cist arguments to succeed; or the presupposition of highly-localized specific brain
functions may be needed for a phrenology-related argument to get through. When
we intuitively accept the conclusions of arguments we may thereby also commit to
the existence of their posits (as made explicit in the logical forms of adequate for-
malizations). Conversely, such arguments can be attacked by calling into question
the mere existence of what they posit.
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of us (e.g. about pets), which includes the sentence “Nemo lives in the bucket”,
the term “Nemo” may refer to an object falling under the “fish” predicate and
the expression “the bucket” may refer to some kind of waterless cage. If, in spite
of this rather clumsy interpretation, the theory is still consistent, we would say
that the theory somehow ‘underperforms’: it does not place enough constraints
as to preclude undesired interpretations, i.e. has models which are not intended.
Underperforming theories (ontologies) in this sense are more the rule than the
exception. Now let us put the previous discussion in formal terms (taken from
Guarino et al. [43]):
Definition 2 (Extensional relational structure). An extensional relational
structure, (or a conceptualization according to Genesereth and Nilsson [39]), is
a tuple 〈D,R〉 where D is a set called the universe of discourse and R is a set
of (extensional) relations on D.
Definition 3 (Extensional first-order structure, or model). Let L be a
first-order logical language with vocabulary V and S = 〈D,R〉 an extensional
relational structure. An extensional first-order structure (also called model for
L) is a tuple M = 〈S, I〉, where I (called extensional interpretation function) is
a total function I : V → D ∪R that maps each vocabulary symbol of V to either
an element of D or an extensional relation belonging to the set R.
Definition 4 (Intensional first-order structure, or ontological commit-
ment). Let L be a first-order logical language with vocabulary V and C =
〈D,W,R〉 an intensional relational structure (i.e. a conceptualization). An in-
tensional first-order structure (also called ontological commitment) for L is a
tuple K = 〈C, I〉, where I (called intensional interpretation function) is a total
function I : V → D ∪ R that maps each vocabulary symbol of V to either an
element of D or an intensional relation belonging to the set R.
Definition 5 (Intended models of a theory w.r.t. a formal conceptu-
alization). Let C = 〈D,W,R〉 be a conceptualization, L a first-order logical
language with vocabulary V and ontological commitment K = 〈C, I〉. A model
M = 〈S, I〉, with S = 〈D,R〉, is called an intended model of L according to K
iff
1. For all constant symbols c ∈ V we have I(c) = I(c)
2. There exists a world w ∈W such that, for each predicate symbol v ∈ V there
exists an intensional relation ρ ∈ R such that I(v) = ρ and I(v) = ρ(w)
The set IK(L) of all models of L that are compatible with K is called the set of
intended models of L according to K.
Definition 6 (An ontology). Let C be a conceptualization, and L a logical
language with vocabulary V and ontological commitment K. An ontology OK for
C with vocabulary V and ontological commitment K is a logical theory consisting
of a set of formulas of L, designed so that the set of its models approximates the
set IK(L) of intended models of L according to K (see Fig. 1).
8 D. Fuenmayor and C. Benzmu¨ller
Fig. 1. Model “m1” is a non-intended model of the ‘good’ yet incomplete ontology;
whereas “m2” is an intended model left out by the unsound, ‘bad’ ontology.
Given the definitions above we might conclude, following Guarino, that an
ideal ontology is one whose models exactly coincide (modulo isomorphism) with
the intended ones. Variations to this ideal would entail (with respect to a for-
mal conceptualization) either (i) incompleteness: the ontology has models that
are non-intended, and thus truth in the conceptualization does not entail va-
lidity in the ontology (logical theory); or (ii) unsoundness: the ontology rules
out intended models. This latter situation is the most critical, since the ontol-
ogy qua logical theory would license inferences that are not valid in the target
conceptualization.8 (See Fig. 1 for a diagrammatic illustration.)
Back to the idea of computational hermeneutics, we concede that there are no
means of mechanically verifying coherence with a conceptualization simpliciter,
the latter being something tacit, fuzzy and unarticulated. However, we do have
the means of deducing and checking consequences drawn from a logical theory,
and this is indeed the reason why computational hermeneutics relies on the use of
automated theorem proving. Regarding formal conceptualizations, we may have
the means of mechanically verifying coherence with them (since they are well-
defined mathematical structures), but this would not bring us much further. As
mentioned before, a formal conceptualization is a fictional mathematical object,
which might at best serve as a model (in the sense of being an approximated
representation) for some real —though unarticulated— conceptualization. The
notion of formal conceptualization has been brought forth in order to enable
the previous theoretical analysis and foster understanding. Hopefully, we can
now make better sense of the claim that computational hermeneutics works by
8 Guarino further considers factors like language expressivity (richness of logical and
non-logical vocabulary) and scope of the domain of discourse in having a bearing on
the degree to which an ontology specifies a conceptualization.
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Fig. 2. An idealized, straightforward interpretive approach.
iteratively evolving a logical theory towards adequately approximating a con-
ceptualization, thus making the latter explicit.
2.4 An Idealized Interpretive Approach
As illustrated above, in artificial intelligence and knowledge engineering, on-
tologies correspond to logical theories and introduce a vocabulary (logical and
non-logical) together with a set of formalized sentences (formulas). Some of these
formulas: axioms, directly aim at ruling out unintended interpretations of the
vocabulary so that as many models as possible correspond to those worlds (i.e.
maximal states of affairs) compatible with our target (formal) conceptualiza-
tion. Theorems also do this, but indirectly, by constraining axioms (since the
former have to follow from the latter). Hence, an ontology qua logical theory
delimits what is possible ‘from the outside’, i.e. it tells us which interpretations
of the given symbols (vocabulary) are not acceptable with respect to the way we
intuitively understand them. Every time we add a new sentence to the theory
we are rejecting those symbols’ interpretations (i.e. models) which render the
(now augmented) theory non-valid. Conversely, when removing a sentence some
interpretations (models) become acceptable again. We can thus think of a mech-
anism to iteratively evolve a logical theory by adding and removing axioms and
theorems, while getting appropriate feedback about the adequacy of our theory
changes. Such a mechanism would converge towards an optimal solution insofar
as we can get some kind of quantitative feedback regarding how well the models
of our theory are approximating the intended ones (i.e. the target formal concep-
tualization). As discussed more fully below, this is a quite simplistic assumption.
However, it is still worth depicting for analysis purposes as we did for (fictional)
formal conceptualizations. This is shown in Fig. 2.
As mentioned before, formal conceptualizations do not exist in real life. We do
not start our interpretive endeavors with a listing of all individual entities in the
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Fig. 3. A more realistic view, where a conceptualization is a moving target.
domain of discourse together with the relations that may acceptably hold among
them. We have therefore no way to actually determine which are our intended
models. In the situation depicted in Fig. 2 we were chasing a ghost. Moreover
—to make things more interesting— our conceptualization indeed changes as
we move through our interpretive process: We learn more about the concepts
involved and about the consequences of our beliefs. We can even call some of
them into question and change our minds. Fig. 3 shows a more realistic view of
the problem, where we are chasing a moving target.
However, not all hope is lost. In the context of argumentative discourse, we
still believe in the possibility of devising a feedback mechanism which can account
for the adequacy of our interpretive logical theories. Instead of contrasting sets
of models with formal conceptualizations, we will be putting sets of formalized
sentences and (extracts from) natural-language arguments side-by-side and then
comparing them among different dimensions. Thus, we will be reversing the
account given by Guarino and his colleagues, by arguing that conceptualizations
first originate (i.e. come into existence in an explicit and articulated way) in
the process of developing an interpretive theory. Conceptualizations correspond
with ‘objective reality’ to a greater or lesser extent as they license inferential
moves which are endorsed by a linguistic community in the context of some
argumentative discourse (seen as a network of arguments). The diagram shown
in Fig. 4 gives a general idea of our interpretive approach.
3 A Hermeneutic Approach
Argumentative discourse and conceptualizations are two sides of a coin. In the
previous section we briefly mentioned the idea of putting logical theories and
natural-language arguments side-by-side and then comparing them among dif-
ferent dimensions. One of those dimensions —indeed, the main one— is truth,
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Fig. 4. How (models of) logical theories represent conceptualizations.
or more appropriately for arguments: logical correctness.9 This idea has been
inspired by Donald Davidson philosophy of language, in particular, his notion
of radical interpretation. In this section we aim at showing how the problem of
formalizing argumentative discourse, understood as networks of arguments mu-
tually attacking and supporting each other, relates to the problem of adequately
representing a conceptualization. We share with the supporters of logical ex-
pressivism (see e.g. [18,48]) the view that logical theories are means to explicitly
articulate the rules implicit in discursive practices.
3.1 Hermeneutic Circle
Previously, we hinted at the possibility of a feedback mechanism that can ac-
count for the adequacy of our interpretive logical theories. We commented on
the impossibility of directly contrasting the models of our theories with the tar-
get conceptualization (determining the theory’s intended models), which would
9 Logical correctness encompasses, among others, the more traditional concept of
logical validity. Our working notion of logical correctness also encompasses ax-
ioms/premises consistency and lack of circularity (no petitio principii) as well as
avoiding idle premises. Other accounts may consider different criteria. We have
restricted ourselves to the ones that can be efficiently computed with today’s
automated reasoning technology. See [50] for an interesting discussion of logical
(in)correctness.
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have given us a straightforward search path for the ‘best’ theory (see Fig. 2).
The main difficulty is that, aside from their complex tacit nature, conceptual-
izations are also a moving target (as shown in Fig. 3). Our conceptualizations
are work in progress and continually change as we take part in socio-linguistic
practices, especially argumentation. We may thus call them working conceptu-
alizations, since they are invariably subject to revision. This can be seen both at
the individual and societal level. For instance, when we as understanding agents
become more aware of (or even learn something new about) our concepts and be-
liefs. As a community of speakers, through interpretive reconstruction of public
discourse, we can become more self-conscious of our tacit conceptualizations as
framed by prevalent discursive practices, thus enabling their critical assessment
and eventual revision.10
Adhering to the slogan: “Every formalization is an interpretation”, the logical
analysis of arguments becomes essentially an interpretive endeavor. A character-
istic of this endeavor is its recursive, holistic nature. The logical forms —as well
as the meanings— of the individual statements comprising an argument (net-
work) are holistically interconnected. At any point in our interpretive process,
the adequacy of the formalization of some statement (sentence) will hinge on the
way other related sentences have been formalized so far, and thus depend on the
current state of our interpretive theory, i.e. on our working conceptualization.
Donald Davidson aptly illustrates this situation in the following passage [26,
p. 140].
“. . . much of the interest in logical form comes from an interest in logical geography:
to give the logical form of a sentence is to give its logical location in the totality of
sentences, to describe it in a way that explicitly determines what sentences it entails
and what sentences it is entailed by. The location must be given relative to a specific
deductive theory; so logical form itself is relative to a theory.”
We thus conceive this hermeneutic interpretive endeavor as a holistic, iter-
ative enterprise. We start with tentative, simple candidate formalizations of an
argument’s statements and iteratively use them as stepping stones on the way
to the (improved) formalization of others. The adequacy of any sentence’s for-
malization becomes tested by evaluating the logical correctness of the formalized
arguments (from which it is a component). Importantly, evaluating logical cor-
rectness is a holistic operation that involves all of an argument’s constituent
sentences. That is, the result of any formalization’s adequacy test becomes de-
pendent not only upon the choice of the particular formula that is put to the
test, but also upon previous formalization choices for its companion sentences
in the arguments composing a discourse (i.e. an argument network). Moreover,
the formalization of any individual sentence depends (by compositionality) on
the way its constituent terms have been explicated (using meaning postulates).
10 Sharing a similar background and motivation, computational hermeneutics might
support a technological implementation of contemporary approaches for the revi-
sionary philosophical analysis of public discourse like ameliorative analysis (in par-
ticular, as presented in [47]), conceptual ethics [22], and conceptual engineering (e.g.
as discussed in [20]).
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Thus, our approach does justice to the inherent circularity of interpretation,
where the whole is understood compositionally on the basis of its parts, while
each part can only be understood in the context of the whole. In the philosoph-
ical literature (particularly in [37]) this recursive nature of interpretation has
been termed: the hermeneutic circle.
3.2 Radical Interpretation
By putting ourselves in the shoes of an interpreter aiming at ‘translating’ some
natural-language argument into a formal representation, we have had recourse to
Donald Davidson’s philosophical theory of radical interpretation [27]. Davidson
builds upon Quine’s account of radical translation [51], which is an account of
how it is possible for an interpreter to understand someone’s words and actions
without relying on any prior understanding of them.11 Since the radical inter-
preter cannot count on a shared language for communication nor the help of
a translator, she cannot directly ask for any kind of explanations. She is thus
obliged to conceive interpretation hypotheses (theories) and put them to the test
by gathering ‘external-world’ evidence regarding their validity. She does this by
observing the speaker’s use of language in context and also by engaging in some
basic dialectical exchange with him/her (e.g. by making utterances while point-
ing to objects and asking yes–no kind of questions).
Davidson’s account of radical interpretation builds upon the idea of taking
the concept of truth as basic and extracting from it an account of interpreta-
tion satisfying two general requirements: (i) it must reveal the compositional
structure of language, and (ii) it can be assessed using evidence available to the
interpreter. The first requirement (i) is addressed by noting that a theory of
truth in Tarski’s style [56] (modified to apply to natural language) can be used
as a theory of interpretation. This implies that, for every sentence s of some ob-
ject language L, a sentence of the form: «“s” is true in L iff p» (aka. T-schema)
can be derived, where p acts as a translation of s into a sufficiently expressive
language used for interpretation (note that in the T-schema the sentence p is
being used, while s is only being mentioned). Thus, by virtue of the recursive
nature of Tarski’s definition of truth, the compositional structure of the object-
language sentences becomes revealed. From the point of view of computational
hermeneutics, the sentence s is to be interpreted in the context of a given argu-
ment (or a network of mutually attacking/supporting arguments). The language
L thereby corresponds to the idiolect of the speaker (natural language), and the
target language is constituted by formulas of our chosen logic of formalization
(some expressive logic XY ) plus the meta-logical turnstyle symbol `XY signi-
fying that an inference (argument or argument step) is valid in logic XY. As an
11 In this sense, Davidson has emphatically made clear that he does not aim at show-
ing how humans actually interpret let alone acquire natural language. This being
rather a subject of empirical research (e.g. in cognitive science and linguistics) [25].
However, Davidson’s philosophical point becomes particularly interesting in artificial
intelligence, as regards the design of artificial language-capable machines.
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illustration, consider the following instance of the T-schema:
«“Fishes are necessarily vertebrates” is true [in English, in the context of argument A]
iff A1, A2, ..., An `MLS4 “∀x. Fish(x) → Vertebrate(x)”»
where A1, A2, ..., An correspond to the formalization of the premises of argument
A and the turnstyle `MLS4 corresponds to the standard logical consequence re-
lation in the chosen logic of formalization, e.g. a modal logic S4 (MLS4).12 This
toy example aims at illustrating how the interpretation of a statement relates
to its logic of formalization and to the inferential role it plays in a single ar-
gument. Moreover, the same approach can be extended to argument networks.
In such cases, instead of using the notion of logical consequence (represented
above as the parameterized logical turnstyle `XY), we can work with the notion
of argument support. It is indeed possible to parameterize the notions of support
and attack common in argumentation theory with the logic used for argument’s
formalization [36].
The second general requirement (ii) of Davidson’s account of radical inter-
pretation states that the interpreter has access to objective evidence in order
to judge the appropriateness of her interpretation hypotheses, i.e., access to the
events and objects in the ‘external world’ that cause statements to be true —
or, in our case, arguments to be valid. In our approach, formal logic serves as
a common ground for understanding. For instance, computing the logical va-
lidity (or a counterexample) of a formalized argument constitutes the kind of
objective —or more appropriately: intersubjective— evidence needed to ground
the adequacy of our interpretations, under the charitable assumption that the
speaker (i.e. whoever originated the argument) follows, or at least accepts, sim-
ilar logical rules as we do. In computational hermeneutics, the computer acts
as an (arguably unbiased) arbiter deciding on the correctness of arguments in
the context of some encompassing argumentative discourse —which itself tacitly
frames the conceptualization that we aim at explicitating.
3.3 The Principle of Charity
A central notion in Davidson’s account of radical interpretation is the principle of
charity, which he holds as a condition for the possibility of engaging in any kind of
interpretive endeavor. The principle of charity has been summarized by Davidson
by stating that “we make maximum sense of the words and thoughts of others
when we interpret in a way that optimizes agreement” [27, p. 197]. Hence the
principle builds upon the possibility of intersubjective agreement about external
facts among speaker and interpreter. The principle of charity can be invoked to
make sense of a speaker’s ambiguous utterances and, in our case, to presume
12 As will be described in section 4.1, the semantical embeddings approach [10,4] allows
us to embed different non-classical logics (modal, deontic, intuitionistic, etc.) in
higher-order logic (as meta-language), and to combine them dynamically by adding
and removing axioms.
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(and foster) the correctness of an argument. Consequently, in computational
hermeneutics we assume from the outset that the argument’s conclusions indeed
follow from its premises and disregard formalizations that do not do justice to
this postulate. Other criteria like avoiding inconsistency and petitio principii are
also taken into account. At the argument network level, we foster formalizations
which honor the intended dialectic role of arguments, i.e. attacking or supporting
other arguments as intended.
3.4 Adequacy Criteria of Formalization
We start to see how the problem of formalizing natural-language arguments re-
lates to the problem of explicitating a conceptualization. The interpretive theory
that gradually evolves in the holistic, iterative computational-hermeneutic pro-
cess is composed of those meaning postulates which have become ‘settled’ during
the (many) iterations involving arguments’ formalization and assessment: It is a
logical theory. Not surprisingly, the quality of our resulting theory will be subor-
dinate to the adequacy of the involved argument formalizations. Since arguments
are composed of statements (sentences), the question thus arises: What makes a
certain sentence’s formalization better than another? This topic has indeed been
discussed sporadically in the philosophical literature during the last decades (see
e.g. [16,53,32,19,3]). More recently, the work of Peregrin and Svoboda [49,50] has
emphasized the role of inferential criteria for assessing the adequacy of argument
formalizations. These criteria are quite in tune, because of their inferential na-
ture, with the holistic picture of meaning we present here. Furthermore, they
lend themselves to mechanization with today’s automated reasoning technolo-
gies. We recall these inferential criteria below (from [50]):
(i) The principle of reliability: “φ counts as an adequate formalization of the
sentence S in the logical system L only if the following holds: If an argument
form in which φ occurs as a premise or as the conclusion is valid in L, then
all its perspicuous natural language instances in which S appears as a natural
language instance of φ are intuitively correct arguments.”
(ii) The principle of ambitiousness: “φ is the more adequate formalization of
the sentence S in the logical system L the more natural language arguments in
which S occurs as a premise or as the conclusion, which fall into the intended
scope of L and which are intuitively perspicuous and correct, are instances of
valid argument forms of S in which φ appears as the formalization of S.” [50,
pp. 70-71].
The first principle (i) can be seen as a kind of ‘soundness’ criterion: Ad-
equate formalizations must not validate intuitively incorrect arguments. The
second principle (ii) has an analogous function to that of ‘completeness’ criteria:
We should always aim at the inferentially most fruitful formalization, i.e. the
one which renders as logically valid (correct) the highest number of intuitively
correct arguments. Peregrin and Svoboda have proposed further adequacy cri-
teria of a more syntactic nature, considering similarity of grammatical structure
and simplicity (e.g. number of occurrences of logical symbols). They are not con-
sidered in-depth here. Moreover, many of the ‘settled’ formulas which constitute
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our interpretive (logical) theory will have no direct counterpart in the original
natural-language arguments. They are mostly implicit, unstated premises and
often of a definitional nature (meaning postulates). More importantly, Peregrin
and Svoboda have framed their approach to logical analysis as a holistic, give-
and-take process aiming at reaching a state of reflective equilibrium.13 Our work
on computational hermeneutics can be seen, relatively speaking, as sketching
a possible technological implementation of Peregrin and Svoboda’s (and also
Brun’s [20]) ideas. We are however careful in invoking the notion of reflective
equilibrium for other than illustrative purposes as we strive towards clearly de-
fined and computationally amenable termination criteria for our interpretive
process.14
Not surprisingly, such a holistic approach involves, even for the simplest cases,
a search over a vast combinatoric of candidate formalizations, whose adequacy
has to be assessed at least several hundreds of times, particularly if we take the
logic of formalization as an additional degree of freedom (as we do). An effective
evaluation of the above inferential criteria would thus involve automatically com-
puting the logical validity and consistency of formalized arguments (i.e. proofs).
This is the kind of work automated theorem provers and model finders are built
for. The recent improvements in automated reasoning technology (in particular
for higher-order logics) constitute the main enabling factor for computational
hermeneutics, which would otherwise remain unfeasible if attempted manually
(e.g. carrying out proofs by hand using natural deduction or tableaux calculi).
3.5 Computational Hermeneutics
As concerns human-in-the-loop computational hermeneutics, the dialectical ex-
change between interpreter and speaker depicted above takes place between hu-
mans and interactive proof assistants (think of a philosopher-logician seeking
to translate ‘unfamiliar’ metaphysical discourse into a ‘familiar’ logical formal-
ism). At any instant during our iterative, hermeneutic process, we will have an
evolving set of meaning postulates and a set of further, disposable formulas. We
start each new iteration by extending our working interpretive theory with some
additional axioms and theorems corresponding to the candidate formalization
13 The notion of reflective equilibrium has been initially proposed by Nelson Goodman
[40] as an account for the justification of the principles of (inductive) logic and has
been popularized years later in political philosophy and ethics by John Rawls [52]
for the justification of moral principles. In Rawls’ account, “reflective equilibrium”
refers to a state of balance or coherence between a set of general principles and par-
ticular judgments (where the latter follow from the former). We arrive at such a state
through a deliberative give-and-take process of mutual adjustment between princi-
ples and judgments. More recent methodical accounts of reflective equilibrium have
been proposed as a justification condition for scientific theories [31] and objectual
understanding [2], and as a methodology for conceptual engineering [20].
14 There are ongoing efforts on our part to frame the problem of finding an adequate
interpretive theory as an optimization problem to be approached by appropriate
heuristic methods.
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of some chosen argument.15 In other words, our theory has been temporarily
extended with additional axioms and (possible) theorems corresponding to the
formalizations of an argument’s premises and conclusion(s) respectively. This
(extended) theory is most likely to not be logically correct. It is now our task
as (human or machine) interpreters to come up with the missing axioms that
would validate it without rendering it inconsistent or question-begging, among
others. By doing so, we engage in a dialectical exchange with the computer. The
questions we ask concern, among others, the logical correctness (validity, con-
sistency, non-circularity, etc.) of the so extended formal arguments. Harnessing
the latest developments in (higher-order) theorem proving, such questions can
get answered automatically in milliseconds.
During the process of securing logically correct formalizations for each of the
arguments in the network, we continuously select among the collected formulas
the ones most adequate for our purposes. For this we draw upon the inferential
adequacy criteria presented above —eventually resorting to further discretionary
qualitative criteria. A subset of the formulas will thus qualify for meaning pos-
tulates and are kept for future iterations, i.e. they become ‘settled’.16 Those
meaning postulates can be identified with an ontology as described in section
2.1. They introduce semantic constraints aimed at ensuring that any instantia-
tion of the non-logical vocabulary is in line with our working conceptualization
(i.e. with our tacit understanding of the real-world counterparts these symbols
are intended to denote). This is the way argument analysis helps our interpre-
tive theories evolve towards better representing the conceptualization implicit in
argumentative discourse.
Removing the human from the loop would, arguably, leave us with an ar-
tificial language-capable system. However, to get there we first need to find a
replacement for human ingenuity in the most important ‘manual’ steps currently
involved in the human-in-the-loop process: (i) generating a rough and ready ini-
tial formalization for arguments (which we may call “bootstrapping”); and (ii)
the abductive process of coming up with improved candidate formalizations and
implicit premises. Not surprisingly, these are very difficult tasks; however, they
do not belong to science-fiction. Current developments in natural language pro-
15 Recall that we think of discourses as networks of mutually supporting/attacking
arguments. Each formalized argument can be seen as a collection of axioms and
theorems; the latter being intended to logically follow from a combination of the
former plus some further axioms of a definitional nature (meaning postulates). This
view is in tune with prominent structured approaches to argumentation in artificial
intelligence (cf. [14,30]).
16 As mentioned in section 2.1, there is no definitive criteria for distinguishing meaning
postulates from others (cf. ontological vs. non-ontological or TBox vs. ABox sen-
tences). The heuristics for labeling sentences as meaning postulates thus constitute
another degree of freedom in our interpretive process, which we address primarily
(but not exclusively) by means of inferential adequacy criteria. Moreover, our set
of meaning postulates can at some point become inconsistent, thus urging us to
mark some of them for controlled removal. In this aspect, our approach resembles
reason-maintenance and belief-revision frameworks (cf. [29]).
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cessing and machine learning are important enablers for pursuing this ambitious
goal. Another important aspect for both human-in-the-loop and fully-automated
computational hermeneutics is the availability of databases of natural-language
arguments tagged as either correct or incorrect, as the case may be. After choos-
ing the area of discourse whose conceptualization we are interested in, we proceed
to gather relevant arguments from the relevant databases and form an argument
network with them.17 Note that, in contrast to highly quantitative, big-data
approaches, computational hermeneutics engages in deep semantic analysis of
natural-language, and thus needs far less data to generate interesting results.
As previous case studies for human-in-the-loop computational hermeneutics ap-
plied to ontological arguments have shown (see e.g. [35,36] and section 4.2 below),
working with a handful of sentences already provides interesting characteriza-
tions (as meaning postulates) for the metaphysical concepts involved, e.g. (nec-
essary) existence, contingency, abstractness/concreteness, Godlikeness, essence,
dependence, among others.
4 Examples and Implementation Approaches
In this section we summarily discuss previous case studies and depict technologi-
cal solutions for the implementation of computational hermeneutics. We start by
highlighting the essential role of higher-order automated theorem proving and
the related technique of semantical embeddings. We then depict a landscape of
different tools and technologies which are currently being tested and integrated
to pursue an (increasingly) automated computational hermeneutics.
4.1 Semantical Embeddings
Our focus on theorem provers for higher-order logics is motivated by the no-
tion of logical pluralism: the view that logics are theories of argument’s validity,
where different yet legitimate logics may disagree about which argument forms
are valid. In order to pursue a truly logical-pluralist approach in computational
hermeneutics, it becomes essential that the (candidate) logics of formalization
also form part of our evolving logical theory. That is, the logic of formaliza-
tion needs to find its way into the sentences constituting our interpretive theory.
More specifically, the (meta-logical) definitions for the logical vocabulary used to
encode argument’s sentences become a further set of axioms which can also be it-
eratively varied, added and removed as we go. Thus, computational hermeneutics
targets the flexible combination of different kinds of classical and non-classical
17 Argument databases and arguments extracted from text sources usually provide
information on support and attack relations (see [21,44] and references therein).
Another alternative is to dynamically construct the needed arguments by using the
working theory plus hypothetical premises and conclusions as building stones. Those
arguments would then be presented, in an interactive way, to the user for rejection
or endorsement. This mode of operation would correspond to a kind of inverted (we
could call it ‘Socratic’) question-answering system.
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logics (modal, temporal, deontic, intuitionistic, etc.) through the technique of
semantical embeddings [10,4].
The semantical embeddings approach18 harnesses the expressive power of
classical higher-order logic (HOL) —also Church’s type theory [5]— as a meta-
language in order to embed the syntax and semantics of another logic as an
object language, thereby turning theorem proving systems for HOL into uni-
versal reasoning engines [4]. HOL is a logic of functions formulated on top of
the simply typed λ-calculus, which also provides a foundation for functional
programming. The semantics of HOL is well understood [6]. A variant of this
approach, termed shallow semantical embeddings (SSE), involves the definition
of the logical vocabulary of a target logic in terms of the non-logical vocabulary
(lambda expressions) of our expressive meta-language (HOL). This technique
has been successfully implemented using the interactive proof assistant Isabelle
[46].
SSE has been exploited in previous work for the evaluation of arguments in
philosophy, particularly in metaphysics [13,12,33,35,36]. The formal representa-
tion of metaphysical arguments poses a challenging task that requires the combi-
nation of different kinds of expressive higher-order non-classical logics, currently
not supported by state-of-the-art automated reasoning technology. In particu-
lar, two of the most well-known higher-order proof assistants: Isabelle and Coq
do not support off-the-shelf reasoning with modal logics. Thus, in order to turn
Isabelle into a flexible modal logic reasoner we have adopted the SSE approach.
Isabelle’s logic (HOL) supports the encoding of sets via their characteristic func-
tions represented as λ-terms. In this sense, HOL comes with a in-built notion
of (typed) sets that is exploited in our work for the explicit encoding of the
truth-sets that are associated with the formulas of higher-order modal logic.19
As illustrated in Fig. 5 (lines 21-23), we can embed a modal logic in HOL by
defining the modal  and ♦ operators as meta-logical predicates in HOL and
using quantification over sets of objects of a definite type w, representing the
type of possible worlds or world-states. Formula ϕ, for example, is modeled as
an abbreviation (syntactic sugar) for the truth-set λw.∀v.w R v −→ ϕv, where
R denotes the accessibility relation associated with the modal  operator. All
presented equations exploit the idea that truth-sets in Kripke-style semantics can
be directly encoded as predicates (i.e. sets) in HOL. Modal formulas ϕ are thus
identified with their corresponding truth sets ϕw→o of predicate type w → o.
In a similar vein, first-order predicates (i.e. operating on individuals of type e)
have type e→w→o.
The semantic embeddings approach gives us two important benefits: (i) we
can reuse existing automated theorem proving technology for HOL and apply it
for automated reasoning in non-classical logics (e.g. free [11], modal [10], intu-
18 Note that this approach is not related to the similarly named notion of word em-
beddings in natural language processing (NLP).
19 Note that since Isabelle-specific extensions of HOL (except for prefix polymorphism)
are not exploited in our work, the technical framework we depict here can easily be
transferred to other HOL theorem proving environments.
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Fig. 5. SSE of a higher-order modal logic in Isabelle/HOL.
itionistic [9] and deontic [8] logics); and (ii) the logic of formalization becomes
another degree of freedom in the development of a logical theory and thus can
be fine-tuned dynamically by adding or removing axioms (which are encoded
using HOL as a meta-language).
4.2 Example: Logical Analysis of a Metaphysical Argument
A first application of computational hermeneutics for the logical analysis of
arguments has been presented in [35] (with its corresponding Isabelle/HOL
sources available in [34]). In that work, a modal variant of the ontological argu-
ment for the existence of God, introduced in natural language by the philoso-
pher E. J. Lowe [45], has been iteratively analyzed using our computational-
hermeneutic approach in a human-in-the-loop fashion and, as a result, a ‘most’
adequate formalization has been found. In each series of iterations (seven in
total) Lowe’s argument has been formally reconstructed in Isabelle/HOL em-
ploying varying sets of premises and logics, and the partial results have been
compiled and presented each time as a new variant of the original argument
(starting from Fig. 6 and ending with Fig. 7). In this fashion, Lowe’s argument,
as well as our understanding of it, gradually evolves as we experiment with
different combinations of definitions, premises and logics for formalization.
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Fig. 6. A (non-valid) formalization of Lowe’s argument resulting after the first iteration
series. We can see that the model finder Nitpick [15] has found a countermodel.
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Our computational-hermeneutic process starts with an initial, ‘bootstrapped’
formalization. As expected, such a first formalization is often non-well-formed
and in most cases logically non-valid; it is generated by manually encoding in an
interactive proof assistant (e.g. Isabelle) the author’s natural-language formula-
tion using our logically-educated intuition (and with some help from semantic
parsers). After this first step, an interpretive give-and-take process is set in mo-
tion, and after a few iterations our candidate formalization starts taking shape,
as shown in Fig. 6 where we have validated some of the argument’s partial con-
clusions, though not the main one (where we get a countermodel from model
finder Nitpick[15] in line 51). During this process we apply our human ingenu-
ity to the abductive task of coming up with new formalization hypotheses (i.e.
adding, removing and replacing axioms or definitions) and harness the power of
Isabelle’s automated reasoning tools to assess their adequacy.
Following the principle of charity, our tentative formalizations (logical the-
ories) should become logically valid and meet some inferential (and sometimes
syntactical) criteria to our satisfaction. In our case study, this has happened
after the seventh iteration series, as shown in Fig. 7, where the now simplified
argument20 is not only logically valid (this happened already after the second
iteration series), but also exhibits other desirable features of a more philosophi-
cal nature (as discussed in [35]); we speak here of arriving at a state of reflective
equilibrium (e.g. following [50,20]).
In Fig. 7 we can also see how our set of axioms has become split into ar-
gument’s premises (lines 26-30) and meaning postulates for its featuring con-
cepts (lines 18-23). Here is also shown (line 23) how one of these postulates
corresponds to a (meta-logical) axiom constraining the accessibility relation R,
thus further framing the logic of formalization (modal logic KB). Note that the
(meta-logical) definitions shown in Fig. 5, corresponding to the semantical em-
bedding of modal logic K in Isabelle/HOL, can also be seen as further meaning
postulates. This embedding has, indeed, also evolved during the interpretive
process. For instance, we had to add at some point the formulas that embed
restricted (so-called “actualist”) first-order quantifiers (Fig. 5, lines 30-34), in or-
der to adequately represent the argument (by not trivializing it, as explained in
[35]). As a result of this computational-hermeneutic process, we can see how the
meanings of some (rather obscure) metaphysical concepts, like “necessary exis-
tence”, “contingency”, “abstractness/concreteness”, “metaphysical explanation”
and “dependence”, have become explicitated in the form of logical formulas.
In follow-up work [36], we have extended the approach to logical analysis
previously sketched in [35] by augmenting it with methods as developed in ar-
gumentation theory. The idea is now to consider the dialectic role an argument
plays in some larger area of discourse (represented as a network of arguments).
We have analyzed the contemporary debate around different variants of Go¨del’s
ontological argument obtaining some interesting conceptual insights.
20 In [35] we have produced and discussed other more (or less) complex valid formal-
izations of this argument before finally settling with the one shown in Fig. 7.
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Fig. 7. Result after the last iteration series: a satisfying formalization. Notice the model
generated by Nitpick for the set of axioms (indicating their consistency).
4.3 Technological Feasibility and Implementation Approaches
In this last section we want to briefly discuss some design ideas and challenges
for a software system aimed at automating our computational-hermeneutic ap-
proach. These ideas are currently under development. By sketching a prelimi-
nary technological landscape, we argue for the technological feasibility of highly-
automated computational hermeneutics in practice. In particular, we want to
highlight some of the challenges involved. In Fig. 8, the main component of the
system is the so-called “hermeneutic engine” (which will be expanded below in
Fig. 9). For the time being let us see it as a black box and discuss its inputs and
outputs.
• Input 1: A collection of formalized arguments, i.e. sets of (labeled) for-
mulas. We bootstrap the interpretive process with some initial rough and ready
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Fig. 8. The encompassing technological landscape.
formalizations encoded in a special format for use with automated reasoning
tools. We consider in particular the TPTP syntax [55] as it is well supported
in most higher-order theorem provers. In order to arrive at these collections of
(bootstrapped) formulas from our initial natural-language arguments, we rely
on argumentation mining technology [21,44] and semantic parsers (e.g. the well-
known Boxer system [17]). Depending on the technological choices, the output
format of such tools will most probably be some kind of first-order representa-
tion, e.g. Discourse Representation Structures (DRS) (as in Boxer). We rely on
existing tools supporting the conversion between those first-order representations
and TPTP syntax.
• Input 2: Abstract argument network, i.e. a graph whose nodes are the
labels of the formalized arguments provided in Input 1 and whose edges corre-
spond to attack or support relations. This kind of structures usually constitute
the output of argumentation mining software [21,44].
• Input 3: Lexicons and ontologies play an important role in current ap-
proaches to semantic parsing and argumentation mining (e.g. the Boxer system
has been extended with entity linking to external ontologies [1,38]). Furthermore,
existing ontologies can serve as sources during the abductive step of coming up
with candidate meaning postulates.
• Output: A collection of (improved) argument formalizations, encoded us-
ing appropriate expressive logics. Importantly, these formalizations have to be
logically correct (in contrast to the initial, bootstrapped ones) and are not re-
stricted to the kind of less-expressive first-order outputs of current semantic
parsing technology. During the process, we maintain a set of sentences common
to most formalized arguments and scoring well according to our (mostly inferen-
tial) adequacy criteria. These sentences are then labeled as meaning postulates.
(Recall from section 2.1 that the heuristic to differentiate between meaning and
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empirical postulates is yet another degree of freedom, which is to be determined
on the basis of pragmatic considerations.) In section 2.1 we saw that an ontology
(in computer science) can be thought of as a collection of meaning postulates.
Thus, the output of our interpretive process can serve to create new domain-
specific ontologies or extend existing ones.
Having discussed the inputs and outputs of our core component, we proceed
to roughly outlining its operation in Fig. 9.
Fig. 9. Inside the “hermeneutic engine”.
In a nutshell, the engine adds, removes and modifies the arguments’ formal-
ized sentences (Input 1 ) so that each argument in the network becomes logically
correct, while still fulfilling its intended dialectic role in the network (Input 2 ).
Formalized sentences are continuously rated (and picked out) using the adequacy
criteria described above. Computational hermeneutics is thus an iterative and
two-layered approach. In one layer we apply a formalization procedure to each
individual argument in parallel, which consists in temporarily fixing truth-values
and inferential relations among its sentences, and then, after choosing a logic for
formalization (i.e. the set of axioms constituting the respective semantical em-
bedding in HOL), working back and forth on the formalization of its premises
and conclusions while getting automatic feedback about the adequacy of the
current formalization candidate. An adequate formalization is one which ren-
ders the argument as logically correct and scores high in some additional criteria
(syntactic and inferential). In the next layer we operate at the network level, we
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continuously choose among the many different combinations of adequate argu-
ment formalizations those which honor their intended dialectic roles, i.e. those
which render the arguments as successfully attacking or supporting other argu-
ments in the network as intended. Importantly, we work at these two layers in
parallel (or by continuously switching between them). In this fashion, by engag-
ing in a methodical ‘trial-and-error’ interaction with the computer, we work our
way towards a proper interpretation of a piece of argumentative discourse by
circular movements between its parts and the whole. As shown in Fig. 9, the
output (and usefulness) of our process consists in generating adequate, logically
correct formalizations of natural-language arguments, while at the same time
articulating logical formulas serving as meaning postulates for those concepts
framed by the argumentative discourse in question. These formulas, following
Carnap [23], can be seen as conceptual explications, thereby fulfilling the task of
making the discourse’s implicit conceptualization explicit.
5 Conclusion
Guarino et al. [42,43] saw in their notion of a (formal) conceptualization a touch-
stone for evaluating how good a given logical theory (i.e. an ontology) models
or approximates our conception of reality. As a result of this correspondence
with the ‘real world’, inferences drawn using the theory will lead to intuitively
correct conclusions. Drawing on Guarino’s exposition and terminology, we have
inverted the situation and argued for the thesis that a conceptualization first
becomes articulated by explicitly stating a theory. We can even put it more dra-
matically and say that a conceptualization first comes into existence by its being
disclosed through an adequate logical theory (or more specifically: its models).21
For the sake of our self-conscious analysis of socio-linguistic practices, we can
at any point during an interpretive endeavor equate a conceptualization with
the collection of models of the logical theory under consideration, provided that
this theory satisfies certain adequacy criteria. This has lead us to discuss what
makes an interpretive, logical theory “adequate” in this sense. Drawing upon a
holistic view of meaning and logical form, we have approached this issue by con-
sidering intersubjective argumentative practices (instead of ‘objective reality’)
as our touchstone. That is, the inferences licensed by our adequate theory are
to correspond in a way with the inferences (arguments) endorsed by a commu-
nity of speakers (and always in the context of some specific discourse). We briefly
presented Donald Davidson’s account of radical interpretation [27] together with
some inferential adequacy criteria of formalization recently proposed in the philo-
sophical literature [50] and discussed how they relate to our approach. In the
last section we have presented an exemplary application of (human-in-the-loop)
computational hermeneutics and sketched some technical implementation ap-
proaches towards its further automation. We showed how current technologies
in computational linguistics and automated reasoning enable us to automate
21 Such a reading would be in tune with strong conceptions of existence drawing on
the Quinean slogan “no entity without identity”.
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many of the tasks involved in our (currently human-supported) computational-
hermeneutic approach. Other, difficult to automate tasks, in particular those
concerned with abductive reasoning (in higher-order and/or non-classical log-
ics), pose interesting challenges that we will be addressing in future work. There
are ongoing efforts to frame our approach in terms of a combinatorial opti-
mization problem. Given the underdetermined, inexact nature of the problem
of logical analysis (and the undecidability of theorem proving in higher-order
logics), we do not expect exact algorithms to be found and focus primarily on
(highly-parallelizable) metaheuristics. The integration of machine learning tech-
niques into our approach, in particular regarding the abductive task of suggesting
missing (implicit) argument premises, is also being contemplated.
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